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Virtualization offers many benefits like information security and compatibility issue fix-
ing. This technology is, however, not traditionally used in embedded systems due to the
overhead it produces. Today’s embedded systems have more processing power than the
systems in the past and container technology provides a low overhead solution for virtu-
alization making virtualization possible for embedded devices.
The aim of this thesis was to study the feasibility of container-based virtualization in
embedded real-time Linux. The test system was an embedded real-time Linux device
used for Internet-of-Things solutions. The container technology used in the thesis was
Docker. Docker was chosen as it has a comprehensive documentation and has been
broadly adopted by the industry.
The feasibility was studied by measuring the performance and comparing these results to
other studies and reading information security and software management documentation.
The performance measurements considered POSIX inter-process communication latency,
memory consumption and mass storage usage. The measurements were performed with
both containerized and non-containerized systems to contrast the results. Information
security and software management aspects were studied by inspecting documentation.
The measurements showed that the latency is not affected by the virtualization, mem-
ory consumption is slightly larger and the mass storage usage is considerably larger and
should be taken into account when planning the virtualization. Containers were also per-
ceived to help with information security and make software management easier. The
information security of the containers should not, however, be carelessly trusted.
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Virtualisoinnilla on monia etuja, kuten tietoturva ja yhteensopivuusongelmien korjaus.
Tätä teknologiaa ei kuitenkaan ole perinteisesti käytetty sulautetuissa järjestelmissä sen
tarvitsemien resurssien takia. Nykypäivän sulautetuissa järjestelmissä on enemmän las-
kentatehoa kuin vanhemmissa laitteissa ja ohjelmistokonttiteknologia mahdollistaa vir-
tualisoinnin pienellä resurssien käytöllä, mikä mahdollistaa virtualisoinnin sulautetuissa
järjestelmissä.
Tässä diplomityössä tutkittiin ohjelmistokonttipohjaisen virtualisoinnin soveltuvuutta su-
lautettuun reaaliaika-Linuxiin. Testijärjestelmänä toimi esineiden internetissä käytetty su-
lautettu reaaliaika-Linux-laite. Työssä käytetty ohjelmistokonttiteknologia oli Docker. Doc-
ker valittiin, koska sillä on kattava dokumentointi ja se on teollisuudessa laajasti omak-
suttu teknologia.
Soveltuvuutta tutkittiin mittaamalla järjestelmän suoritustasoa ja vertaamalla tuloksia mui-
hin tutkimuksiin sekä lukemalla tietoturva- ja ohjelmistonhallintadokumentaatiota. Suori-
tustason mittaukset toteutettiin mittaamalla POSIX:n prosessien välisen kommunikoinnin
viivettä, muistin kulutusta ja tallennustilan käyttöä. Mittaukset toteutettiin sekä ohjelmis-
tokonteilla että ilman niitä, jotta tuloksia voitaisiin verrata. Tietoturvaa ja ohjelmistonhal-
lintaa arvioitiin tutkimalla dokumentaatiota.
Mittausten perusteella voidaan päätellä, että virtualisointi ei vaikuta prosessien välisen
kommunikoinnin viiveeseen, muistin käyttö kasvaa hieman ja tallennustilan käyttö kas-
vaa huomattavasti, mikä tulisikin ottaa huomioon virtualisointia suunnitellessa. Ohjel-
mistokonttien myös todettiin auttavan ohjelmiston hallinnassa ja tietoturvassa. Konttien
tietoturvaan ei kuitenkaan tulisi luottaa varauksettomasti.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Containers are a light way of virtualization and are commonly used in software systems
to provide easy software management. They e.g. help deploying new software versions
easily, help with information security and provide an easy way to solve conflicts among
applications running in the system. With containers an application and its dependencies
can be packaged into, and deployed as, a single package commonly referred to as an
image. Containers, which are then executed based on these images, use native operating
system features to isolate applications running inside them from the host system providing
extra security. With containers it is also possible to fix dependency conflicts, e.g. use two
different versions of a library in a system: different images can have different version of
the library in question.
Using containers of course introduces overhead to the system: providing two different ver-
sions of a library consumes approximately two times the space of a single library. Addi-
tionally, running software inside containers needs more operating system (OS) structures
to be used to provide the virtualization for the application which consumes more mem-
ory. Moreover, initializing containers requires time and start up times might be longer
than with natively run software.
With higher end computers such as servers and Personal Computers the overhead intro-
duced by containers is quite minimal compared to the benefits. With embedded systems,
where the system resources are often limited, the use of containers should be evaluated
more carefully.
The aim of this thesis was to study if containers are a feasible technology for embedded
and real-time systems and what are the advantages and disadvantages of using them. The
properties used in evaluation were inter-process communication (IPC) latency, memory
consumption, mass storage usage, information security and software management. The
first three properties were mainly evaluated using measurements and the rest by studying
the Docker documentation. Additionally, studies considering container technologies were
inspected. IPC latency was measured using multiple processes running either natively or
inside container interacting with one another via POSIX IPC. This was chosen as a method
due to easy implementation and small number of variables affecting the measurements.
Memory usage was measured simply by executing the above-mentioned IPC latency test
and at the same time logging the output of free program. Mass storage usage was studied
by inspecting the size of files included in the build by the programs needed by contain-
ers. The container technology chosen for the evaluation was Docker which was chosen
due to already existing Yocto recipe, widespread adoption in industry and comprehensive
documentation.
2Chapter 2 explains the term virtualization and provides an overview of the virtualization
technologies. Chapter 3 discusses the Linux features that consider containers and chap-
ter 4 discusses a container engine, Docker, deployed into the embedded Linux system.
Chapter 5 explains the structure of the tests and how they were executed on the system
followed by chapter 6 discussing the results gained from those measurements. Finally,
chapter 7 concludes the results of the study and discusses the possible continuations for
this thesis.
32. VIRTUALIZATION
This chapter explains the term virtualization and discusses common virtualization tech-
nologies: containers and virtual machines (VM).
2.1 Overview
Term "virtual" can be described as an entity that does not exist yet behaves as if it did.
This is very much how virtualization works in computer systems: part of the system is
isolated from its surroundings and from within this part it seems to be a whole system
itself. Virtualization can be implemented in multiple ways. VMs for example emulate
computers being therefore virtual computers and allow executing software on a software
layer. Containers use the features of the native kernel to isolate processes running in them
from parts of the system while the processes themselves are executed without an extra
software layer added between the processes and hardware.
The virtualization generally makes the system more secure as an attacker getting access to
a virtualized environment does not have access to the whole system. It also allows fixing
compatibility issues among different applications running on a computer but of course has
also disadvantages. The major one is that it produces overhead to the system since some
of the resources of the system need to be used for managing the virtualization features.
2.2 Containers versus Virtual Machines
Containers offer a light way of virtualization and use the native OS features to provide this.
Containers are basically sets of these features which limit the permissions and resources
of the processes inside them. Performing virtualization with containers allows minimal
amount of resources to be used for managing the virtualization and more allocated for the
actual applications.
VMs execute a whole OS with most of its services, such as scheduler. This basically
means that the system has a scheduler running first on the host machine and then on each
virtual machine consuming resources. Comparison of VMs and containers can be seen
in figure 1. In a container system the applications, marked with App, run directly on top
of a kernel while containers, marked with C, only hide parts of the operating system. In
VM system hypervisors run on a host OS each having their own guest OS with their own
services and applications. Hypervisor is the part of the system which provides the layer
between the host and the guest OSs.
4Figure 1. Comparison between containers and virtual machines
When comparing VMs and containers, containers excel in overhead and customization.
The maximum number of containers in a system is far larger than the number of VMs
and Docker actually proposes running one service per container [1]. Isolation between a
container and a host system can also be customized: containers can be completely isolated
from the surrounding system or the isolation can be nonexistent allowing programs inside
the container to behave like normal processes in the host system.
VMs are better than containers in terms of information security. As the host and guest
systems share next to no parts it is harder to harm the host machine from inside the guest
machine. For example, kernel vulnerabilities cannot be exploited. VMs are also not lim-
ited to same kernel as the host unlike containers, e.g. VM running on a host Windows can
have a guest Linux. Containers with Linux binaries inside can be executed on Windows
only by adding a VM in between. Only restriction with VMs is that the binaries often
have to run on the same processor architecture as the hardware provides.
2.3 Container Engines
Containers themselves are quite simple structures but managing them could prove to be
hard if the number of containers in the system grows. Therefore, the containers should
be managed using container engines i.e. applications meant for managing these software
environments. Container engines are rather numerous but some examples are Docker,
LXC, Balena and rkt.
Container industry is highly open sourced, and it is not uncommon to find container en-
gines that support running Open Container Initiative (OCI) based images and containers.
OCI is a project started by Docker that aims to standardize how containers should be pack-
5aged and executed [2]. OCI currently consists of two parts: runtime-spec and image-spec.
The former specifies how to run a file system bundle when it is unpacked on disk and the
latter how container templates, images, should be constructed. If two container engines
support these specifications, e.g. Docker and rkt, their images are compatible with one
another. For example, images built for Docker can be pulled from registry and run using
rkt.
Docker is a broadly adopted container engine that has been in development since 2013
and is discussed in more detail in chapter 4 [3]. Its broad usage in industry, comprehensive
documentation and already existing Yocto recipe were some of the reasons it was chosen
as the technology for this thesis. Yocto is also briefly discussed in chapter 4.
LXC, abbreviation of Linux Containers, was released in 2008 and was the underlying
technology used by Docker versions prior to 1.0 [4] [5] [6, pp. 121]. Initially LXC used
one lxc process for each started container for managing them and the user had to start each
container directly from Command Line Interface (CLI) which might prove complicated
if the number of containers in the system grew. Newer versions of LXC also provide a
Docker-like daemon process LXD which can be used for managing the containers via one
process.
Balena is an open source project forked from the open source version of the Docker
and the source code still has a lot of references to Docker [7]. Balena is aimed more
for embedded systems than Docker and tries to achieve this by reducing the size of the
binaries, minimizing the usage of memory during image pull and using deltas1 instead of
complete images when downloading new versions of images. Balena was considered as a
technology for this thesis but was not chosen as it is still quite young and does not have a
pre-made Yocto recipe.
rkt is, again, an open source project developed for running on CoreOS, a Linux distribu-
tion meant for executing containers [8]. rkt was started in December 2014 and uses its
own format of appc container specification but can also execute Docker images.
1 a difference between two data sets.
63. LINUX PROCESS MANAGEMENT
This chapter discusses Linux resource management, permissions, namespaces and schedul-
ing. Resource management is a Linux feature to limit access rights of processes to e.g.
memory. Resource management method covered in this chapter is control group (cgroup).
Linux permission management is by default user specific but can be changed to process
specific using mandatory access control (MAC). Namespaces provide a light way of vir-
tualizing Linux user space and scheduling provides the OS the means for dividing Central
Processing Unit (CPU) time among the processes. All these features play a key part in
managing process execution context and are also the methods used by containers to man-
age processes inside them.
Linux might well be the most common OS kernel in the world as it is used in devices
spanning from higher end embedded devices such as WRM 247+, to cellphones, servers
and supercomputers [9][10][11][12]. One of the reasons for the popularity of Linux is
without a doubt it being an open source project and therefore relatively easy for anyone
to access and adopt.
3.1 Control Group
Control group is a Linux feature for managing system resources and has two versions:
v1 and v2 [13]. According to Linux documentation cgroup is used when referring to the
whole feature or one control group, plural form is used when explicitly referring to mul-
tiple control groups and the abbreviation is newer capitalized [14]. The initial version of
cgroup has existed since Linux 2.6.24 and the second version was first released as ex-
perimental in kernel 3.10 and made official in kernel 4.5. Control groups are managed
via virtual file system (VFS) which is mounted typically to /sys/fs/cgroup/. The struc-
ture of the VFS is different among the two versions of the cgroups but both provide a
hierarchical structure and use subsystems, aka resource controllers or in short controllers,
for resource management. In cgroup the parent cgroup also limits the resources of child
cgroups. Specific behavior depends on the controller.
Version 1 is far more common than version 2 as it is more mature and supports more
controllers but, in the future, the second version is probably become more common due
to the simpler design and therefore simpler management. The user often does not have to
manage cgroup directly as this is performed by other programs such as Docker discussed
later. Only property of different cgroup versions seen by the user is that some programs
might be incompatible with other version. It is, however, possible to mount both VFSs
at the same time making it possible to use both versions as far as the VFSs do not share
7any controllers (e.g. cpu controller cannot reside in both hierarchies simultaneously) [14].
The largest differences between the two versions are that v2 handles all controllers in one
hierarchy where v1 uses individual hierarchies and v2 enforces no internal process rule
where processes can be placed only in the root and leaf cgroups.
Controllers are used by cgroups to manage system resources [13]. They can be cus-
tomized and are configured to the kernel at compile time. The controllers are non-
hierarchically related to each other and are structured as directory hierarchies under the
cgroup file system with each directory representing a cgroup. In the hierarchy child
cgroups can have less or equal amount of resources as the parent, e.g. if a parent has
10 MiB of memory allocated to it, each child can have a maximum of 10 MiB of memory
allocated. Some controllers additionally limit the child cgroup resources. For example,
setting maximum process count in pids controller cgroup sets maximum limit to whole
sub tree under the cgroup but limiting CPU shares using cpu controller sets the maximum
value of cpu shares to that same value in all descendants. Some examples of the resource
controllers are:
cpu Can be used e.g. to guarantee a minimum count of CPU shares in case the
system is busy
cpuset Can be used to map processes to certain cores
memory For limiting and reporting of process memory, kernel memory and swap
memory
devices Provides a way to manage the permissions for creating, reading and writing
device files
freezer May be used for suspending and restoring different process bundles
pids Limits the total number of processes that can be created in a cgroup and its
children
Control group versions have small differences between controller support, e.g. cpu con-
troller can be used for managing real-time (RT) processes in cgroup v1 but not in v2. As
Linux can have multiple cgroup hierarchies mounted at the same time the controllers can
be distributed between the hierarchies but can only be in one hierarchy at a time. This for
example makes it possible to place all possible controllers into cgroup v2 and use cgroup
v1 for controllers that are not yet supported in cgroup v2.
3.2 Namespaces
Linux namespaces provide a light way to isolate processes from parts of the OS, i.e. they
are a form of virtualization. Where cgroup mainly manages the hardware resources the
namespaces target the OS. Linux has seven namespaces:
8• cgroup namespace
• IPC namespace
• Process Identification Number (PID) namespace
• Mount namespace
• Network namespace
• UNIX Time-sharing System (UTS) namespace
• User namespace
Additionally, GNU has chroot core utility which is not a namespace but can be used for
isolation [6, pp. 105]. Chroot changes the root directory of the calling process but it is
not counted as a namespace because it is not part of kernel and does not provide a full
isolation. For example, open files are kept open and root can escape the pseudo root e.g.
with commands "mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..".
Namespaces are associated with user space programs and these connections are managed
with nsproxy structures which can be seen in program 1. Each process points to zero1 or
one nsproxy instance. Variable count is used to keep track of how many processes use
the corresponding nsproxy. The rest of the variables are pointers to namespace instances
to which the pointing processes belong to except for pid_ns_for_children which points to
PID namespace given to child processes of the pointing process. User namespaces behave
differently compared to other namespaces and are not managed by nsproxy structures
but instead use their own functions. Schematic for connections between processes and
namespaces can be found from figure 2.
1 s t r u c t nsp roxy {
2 a t o m i c _ t c o u n t ;
3 s t r u c t u t s_namespace * u t s _ n s ;
4 s t r u c t i pc_namespace * i p c _ n s ;
5 s t r u c t mnt_namespace * mnt_ns ;
6 s t r u c t p id_namespace * p i d _ n s _ f o r _ c h i l d r e n ;
7 s t r u c t n e t * n e t _ n s ;
8 s t r u c t cgroup_namespace * cg roup_ns ;
9 } ;
Program 1. Proxy structure for managing namespaces in Linux source code[15]
Initially all task_structs in Linux point to a same instance of nsproxy. If a namespace
of a process is changed a new nsproxy instance is created, process is set to point to the
new instance and count variable of new nsproxy is set to 1 and value in old nsproxy is
decremented by one [17].
1 Process does not point to any nsproxies if it has already terminated but its parent process has not
acknowledged the child’s termination, i.e. process is in Zombie state.
9Figure 2. Connections between processes and namespaces they are part of. Adapted
from [16, pp. 50]
Namespaces can be divided into two classes: hierarchical and non-hierarchical. Former
is a parent–child hierarchy where there is one initial namespace which has zero or more
children and all namespace instances can have maximum of one parent. All members of
one namespace are mapped to all ancestor namespaces. In other words, the same member
can have different values when viewed from different namespaces, e.g. a user can have
root permissions in a child namespace but be a normal user in the parent namespace.
Non-hierarchical namespace is a simple structure where all namespaces are isolated from
one another and members of one namespace are not mapped to other namespaces, i.e.
the members are accessible from one namespace only. Principal structures of namespace
hierarchies can be found in figure 3.
Figure 3. Linux namespace relation types. Hierarchical on left and non-hierarchical on
right
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3.2.1 Creating New Namespaces
New namespaces are typically created in Linux using functions clone() and unshare() in
glibc [18] [19]. Both are wrapper functions performing the required system calls for new
namespace creation. clone() creates new processes and configures them with different
settings and unshare() is used by a process to modify its own execution context by creating
new namespaces. Additionally glibc has setns() function which can be used by unthreaded
processes to join already existing namespaces.
Namespaces can be created one at a time or all at once, simply by specifying more flags
to the system calls. When a new process is created using clone() the possible new user
namespace is guaranteed to be created first followed by other namespace instances point-
ing to the newly created user namespace [20].
3.2.2 UTS Namespace
UTS namespaces are non-hierarchical and simplest of the Linux namespaces. "UTS"
derives from the name of the structure struct utsname passed to uname() system call which
then again derives from "UNIX Time-sharing System" [21]. This term is legacy from 60’s
and 70’s where computation was performed on large mainframes and computation time
was divided into time slices among the users. Nowadays this namespace has little to
nothing to do with time. UTS namespace functionality is demonstrated in program 2.
1 sh # domainname
2 ( none )
3 sh # unshare −u
4 sh # domainname mydomain
5 sh # domainname
6 mydomain
7 sh # l o g o u t
8 sh # domainname
9 ( none )
Program 2. Demonstration of UTS namespace
First command is used for checking the initial value of domain name in UTS name fol-
lowed by unshare -u which unshares the current UTS namespace of the shell creating
a new namespace. After this the command on line 4 renames the domain field of UTS
namespace which is then checked on line 5. Logout is then used to exit the newly created
namespace and querying domain name after this produces the initial value.
3.2.3 Inter-process Communication Namespace
IPC is a collection of OS features meant for communication between processes. These in-
clude e.g. System V shared semaphores, inter-process memory, pipes and UNIX sockets.
11
IPC namespace virtualizes IPC view of processes assigned to it, with exception to sockets
which are managed by network namespaces [22]. Note that IPC namespaces do not affect
POSIX IPC, apart from message queues. "Unsharing" rest of the POSIX IPC requires re-
moving access to /dev/shm, e.g. by mount namespaces. IPC namespaces are quite simple
structures since their relation is non-hierarchical which also implies that two processes
communicating via IPC have to be in same namespace and a process whose child resides
in different IPC namespace has to communicate with the child via other means, e.g. by
previously mentioned UNIX sockets. IPC namespaces can be demonstrated simply with
program 3.
1 # i p c s
2 <IPC i n f o r m a t i o n >
3 # n e t s t a t −a | grep "^ u n i x "
4 < S oc ke t i n f o r m a t i o n >
5 # unshare − i
6 # i p c s
7 <Empty IPC i n f o r m a t i o n >
8 # n e t s t a t −a | grep "^ u n i x "
9 < S oc ke t i n f o r m a t i o n >
Program 3. IPC Namespace Demonstration
The program ipcs shows information about IPC structures and netstat about sockets. The
unshare call will remove all entries from ipcs listing but does not affect netstat as it is
managed by network namespaces.
3.2.4 Process Identification Number Namespace
Linux PID namespaces are a hierarchical system where a global namespace exists on level
zero containing all absolute PIDs which are also the PIDs that kernel uses for referencing
processes [16, pp. 47]. When a new PID namespace is created the first process of the
namespace is given the PID of 1, i.e. it is the init process of that namespace. As seen in
the program 1 the value stored in nsproxy structure points to namespace given to child
processes. This means that process cannot change its namespace but is able to modify
into which namespace its children are placed.
The init processes have special tasks in Linux, one being that they are the parent processes
of processes that are orphaned. In normal case when a process dies leaving all or some
of its children alive the children are moved under the init process but this step cannot be
performed when an init process of a namespace exits as there is no process under which
the children could be moved. Due to this all processes in a namespace are terminated
when the init process of a namespace exits. PID namespace demonstration can be seen in
programs 4 and 5.
The script compares the behavior of two program calls: unshare -fp and unshare -p. In the
former case unshare system call is followed by fork placing the new child in the names-
12
1 # ! / b i n / sh
2
3 d o _ c h i l d ( ) {
4 echo " I ’m c h i l d . My PID : $$ "
5 }
6
7 d o _ p a r e n t ( ) {
8 echo " I ’m p a r e n t . My PID : $$ "
9 # Unshare PID namespace and f o r k a new c h i l d
10 u n s h a r e −fp $0 c h i l d &
11 CHILD_PID=$ !
12 echo " I ’m p a r e n t . C h i l d PID : $CHILD_PID "
13 wait $CHILD_PID
14 # Unshare PID namespace w i t h o u t f o r k i n g
15 u n s h a r e −p $0 c h i l d &
16 CHILD_PID_2=$ !
17 echo " I ’m p a r e n t . C h i l d PID : $CHILD_PID_2 "
18 wait $CHILD_PID_2
19
20 }
21
22 # E x e c u t e p a r e n t i f n o t arguments
23 # or t h e f i r s t argument i s d i f f e r e n t t han " c h i l d "
24 i f [ $# −eq 0 ] ; t h e n
25 d o _ p a r e n t
26 e l i f [ $1 = " c h i l d " ] ; then
27 d o _ c h i l d
28 e l s e
29 d o _ p a r e n t
30 f i
Program 4. PID Namespace Demonstration Script
1 I ’m p a r e n t . My PID : 6359
2 I ’m p a r e n t . C h i l d PID : 6360
3 I ’m c h i l d . My PID : 1
4 I ’m p a r e n t . C h i l d PID : 6362
5 I ’m c h i l d . My PID : 6362
Program 5. PID Namespace Demonstration Example Output
pace pointed by pid_ns_for_children in struct nsproxy. In the latter case PID namespace
is unshared but as the unsharing only affects the child processes created after unsharing
the child PID is placed in the same PID namespace as parent. This behavior can be seen
in program 5 where in the first program execution the PIDs seen by parent and child are
different but in the second execution the PIDs match.
3.2.5 User Namespace
User namespaces are structured hierarchically and are a parent namespace for all other
namespaces as all other namespace structures have a pointer to a user namespace instance,
i.e. other namespaces belong to exactly one user namespace [23].
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Linux references different users using their kuids (kernel UID) which are not visible to
user space [16, pp. 47]. Users actually have multiple different kinds of UIDs in user space
but what are of interest here are effective UIDs of which the users have one in namespace
they are part of and one for each ancestor namespace. When a new user namespace is
created by clone() system call the newly created child is given all capabilities2 in the new
namespace and if the creation is performed with unshare() all capabilities are given to the
current process.
By default, all namespaces apart from user namespace require root permissions for cre-
ation but since a process creating a user namespace gains all capabilities it is possible for a
non-root user to create a whole set of namespaces if the user creates a new user namespace
first. As the user namespace is guaranteed to be created first when specified in a system
call the namespace can be created with a single system call with other namespaces. The
user namespace behavior can be seen in program 6.
1 $ i d −u
2 1000
3 $ u n s h a r e − i
4 u n s h a r e : u n s h a r e f a i l e d : O p e r a t i o n n o t p e r m i t t e d
5 $ u n s h a r e −Ur
6 # i d −u
7 0
8 # u n s h a r e − i
9 # echo " t e s t " > f i l e _ o w n e d _ b y _ r e a l _ r o o t . t x t
10 −bash : f i l e _ o w n e d _ b y _ r e a l _ r o o t . t x t : P e r m i s s i o n d e n i e d
Program 6. User Namespace Demonstration
Rows starting with $ are executed as non-root and # as root. The first unshare fails as
unsharing requires root permissions except for the user namespace. After the user names-
pace has been unshared the unsharing of IPC namespace succeeds as the user is now a
root in the new namespace. The new root is not, however, a root in a global scope which
can be seen when trying to modify files belonging to the real root as in the global scope
the UID is always the initial 1000.
3.2.6 Mount Namespace
Mount namespaces, also known as virtual file system namespaces or file system names-
paces, control what mount points different processes see [25]. They are a useful way
to control file system access for processes and work by providing different mount point
lists for different processes. They were the first namespace added to Linux kernel, ap-
pearing first in version 2.4.19 in 2002. In command line, mount namespace functionality
2 In Linux a capability is an atomic privilege to perform a task, e.g. CAP_KILL bypasses the permission
check for sending signals [24]. Root processes have all capabilities.
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can be demonstrated by performing commands in program 7. Mount namespace structure
produced by these commands is shown in figure 4.
1 sh1 # mount −−make−p r i v a t e /
2 sh1 # mount −−make−sh ar ed / dev / sda3 / X
3 sh1 # mount −−make−sh ar ed / dev / sda5 / Y
4
5 sh2 # unshare −m −−p r o p a g a t i o n unchanged sh
6
7 sh1 # mkdir / Z
8 sh1 # mount −−b ind / X / Z
Program 7. Mount namespace demonstration [25]
In the first set of commands, run with shell number one, root directory / is mounted as a
private mount point meaning that it and its children are not propagated into other names-
paces and two other mount points /X and /Y are created. /X and /Y are created as shared
mount points overriding the private status of the parent. The second set of commands,
run on shell number 2, creates a new mount namespace (-m) copying the current names-
pace (--propagation unchanged) and executed sh command in the new environment. The
third and final set creates a new directory and binds the sub tree found in /X to /Z. Due
to private property of root mount point defined in the first set of commands, mounting
of /Z is not propagated into mount namespace inhabited by shell two, but if similar bind
mount would be executed in e.g. /X, the changes would propagate to 2nd namespace. It
must be noted that namespaces do not affect files so modifying a file in 1st shell would
be possible to see from 2nd shell, only the mount point changes are not seen, i.e. a new
volume mounted in root of shell 1 would not be seen in shell 2.
Figure 4. Mount namespace structure produced by demonstration [25]
3.2.7 Control Group Namespace
cgroup namespaces are used for virtualizing the view of cgroups seen by processes. In
user space this means virtualizing the view of cgroups under /proc/self/cgroup. This ba-
sically works by moving virtual roots of the resource controllers down the hierarchy and
works similarly with both versions of cgroup. Control group namespace itself is not
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enough to virtualize cgroups. File system under the mount point of cgroup is still identical
in all cgroup namespaces but instead the hierarchy is virtualized via mount namespaces
[14] [26].
The main purpose for this namespace is to hide the system level view from the resource
controllers and to provide better portability. Without this namespace programs running
inside a virtualized execution context will still be able to gain information about the host
system which is problematic for information security. Portability issues then again would
rise with name conflicts, e.g. two instances of a same program running at a same time
might try to manage cgroups with same names.
The namespace documentation does not seem to explicitly specify if processes in cgroup
namespace can be placed into virtual root cgroups but as the virtualization works by mov-
ing the root down the hierarchy the no internal processes rule is probably enforced from
the root cgroup namespace’s point of view [14]. A demonstration of cgroup functionality
can be seen in program 8.
1 # mkdir −p / s y s / f s / cgroup / f r e e z e r / sub
2 # echo 0 > / s y s / f s / cgroup / f r e e z e r / sub / cgroup . p r o c s
3 # c a t / proc / s e l f / cgroup | grep f r e e z e r
4 3 : f r e e z e r : / sub
5 # unshare −C
6 # c a t / proc / s e l f / cgroup | grep f r e e z e r
7 3 : f r e e z e r : /
Program 8. Simple cgroup namespace demonstration
The first two commands create a new freezer cgroup and move the calling process to that
group followed by command which checks the current freezer cgroup path. The following
commands then unshare the cgroup namespace and check the freezer cgroup path in the
new namespace which is now seen as a root.
3.2.8 Network Namespace
Network namespaces provide the means to create virtual networks inside Linux systems
[27]. The namespaces modify how the processes see network devices, protocol stacks, IP
routing tables, firewall rules, port numbers, parts of the file system considering network
etc.
Physical network interfaces, such as eth0, can exist only in one namespace at a time and
in case all processes in the namespace containing a physical interface are terminated, the
interface is moved to parent namespace [27]. Different namespaces can be connected to
each other by using virtual Internet interfaces, veths, which exist in pairs. One end of a
veth can then be used by processes inside the namespace and other end can be connected
to another interface which can be either also a virtual or a physical interface. An example
network topology can be seen in figure 5.
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Figure 5. Linux network namespace topology
Network namespace functionality can be demonstrated using commands ping 8.8.8.8;
unshare -n; ping 8.8.8.8 as root which would first ping the given IP followed by changing
the network namespace of the shell removing all network interfaces causing the second
ping to fail. More functional example, like connecting the new network namespace to the
Internet would need a lot more work like setting up routing tables, IP forwarding etc.
3.3 Mandatory Access Control
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is a method of hardening the system, i.e. enhancing
information security by disabling all extra process permissions. Default behavior in Linux
is to manage permissions by users and groups. With this approach all the processes of the
same user have same permissions and can modify all files belonging to that user. MAC
mechanisms change this granularity from user to individual processes so processes of
same user can have different permissions e.g. to file system. In Linux MAC is generally
performed using Linux security module (LSM) kernel framework designed for hardening
Linux systems [28]. Using LSM with addition to basic user-based access control increases
system security as attacks that use e.g. code injections and buffer overflows can be more
easily prevented. Some examples of kernel extensions that use LSM are Application
Armor (AppArmor) and Safety Enhanced Linux (SELinux), both consisting of a kernel
module and user space programs designed for enforcing MAC rules [29].
LSMs can be used for controlling process permissions to files, capabilities, network ac-
cess and resource limits. This set of permissions is generally called a profile, which is a
human-readable file found e.g. under /etc/apparmor.d if AppArmor is used. Profile files
are typically quite lengthy but e.g. adding line deny /bin/** w would remove write per-
missions to /bin/ and all its descendant directories from processes with the given profile.
This can also include processes belonging to root.
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3.4 Scheduling
Scheduling in Linux is performed using scheduling classes and schedule() system call. In
addition to these e.g. Mauerer explains scheduling with two extra entities: main scheduler
and periodic scheduler [16, pp. 86,87]. These are not actually features in the kernel but
ways how schedule() is called: main scheduler is called when a change happens in system
processes, e.g. when a process starts to wait for semaphore or exits, and periodic scheduler
is called periodically, as the name states. When the scheduler is initiated it goes through
scheduling classes starting from the highest priority (deadline scheduling) to the lowest
(idle scheduling) and picks the first available process [30][31].
Linux has six scheduling policies, from highest priority to lowest, SCHED_DEADLINE,
SCHED_FIFO, SCHED_RR, SCHED_OTHER, SCHED_BATCH and SCHED_IDLE. The
first three are different kinds of RT scheduling policies: processes with SCHED_DEADLINE
have deadlines, processes with SCHED_FIFO are RT processes which are executed un-
til they voluntarily give up the CPU and processes with SCHED_RR are executed using
Round-Robin scheduling algorithm. Following the RT policies are the default scheduling
policy used by Linux, SCHED_OTHER, which means that a process using it is scheduled
using Completely Fair Scheduler (CFS) and SCHED_BATCH which is meant for non-
interactive tasks which are slightly disfavored in scheduling decisions and are preempted
less frequently than SCHED_OTHER processes. Finally, SCHED_IDLE is for tasks with
really low priorities which are run only if no other tasks need the CPU. Linux schedul-
ing classes are, from the highest to the lowest priority, stop_sched_class, dl_sched_class,
rt_sched_class, fair_sched_class and idle_sched_class where stop_sched_class is used in
symmetric multiprocessing systems to disable cores. The relation between scheduling
policies and scheduling classes can be seen in figure 6.
Figure 6. Mapping between scheduling policies and scheduling classes
Linux uses numerical process priorities ranging from -1 to 140 in parallel with scheduling
classes to find out if new available tasks have permissions to interrupt currently running
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tasks in kernel mode, i.e. when a task is performing system calls [32]. The mapping of
priorities between kernel and user space can be seen in figure 7.
Figure 7. Priorities of Linux processes
In user space, deadline scheduling processes do not have priorities and according to kernel
they always have static priority of -1. The actual priority itself is dynamic and calculated
based on the time left before deadline. RT processes have priorities running from 0 to 99,
99 being the highest priority in user space, and in kernel these are inverted 0 becoming
99 and 99 becoming 0. Normal processes have nice values from -20 to 19 in user space
mapping to values from 100 to 139 in kernel. Batch processes have the same priority
range as normal processes but have longer execution time slices and are presumed as
CPU-intensive. In the user space the nice values function as weights for the processes,
i.e. a process with a smaller nice value will have more execution time than a process with
larger nice value. Idle processes are the processes with the lowest priority, even lower
than nice 19 and are executed when no other processes need execution.
3.5 Real-Time Linux
Real-Time (RT) Linux (not to be mixed with RTLinux) is a child project for Linux and
not included in the Linux Git repository since it would only benefit few of the Linux
users and produce a lot of extra work [33]. Instead the project is hosted on Git repository
on kernel.org [34]. RT Linux is typically built by first pulling Linux project from Git
followed by downloading a .patch file from kernel.org, applying this .patch file to the
project and finally configuring the Linux build before building the kernel.
The aim of RT Linux is to minimize the latency of Linux kernel. This is done by making
the kernel as preemptible as possible e.g. by replacing spinlocks with mutexes. This
causes RT Linux not to be an ideal RTOS since hard deadlines cannot be fully guaranteed
but works well for soft RT tasks. The advantage of RT Linux is the support of same
system calls as normal Linux. This makes reusing code easier since non-RT tasks can
often be implemented with binaries available for normal Linux.
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4. DOCKER
This chapter discusses container engine Docker briefly mentioned in the end of chapter
2. The focus of this chapter is Docker version 1.12.5 as it was the version deployed to
embedded Linux in this thesis and the Docker versions have major differences as the
project is still quite young.
4.1 Overview
Docker is a tool implemented in Go, used for configuring, building, running and dis-
tributing application containers [35] [3]. A high level architecture of Docker can be found
in figure 8. Different arrow types in the figure represent different operations. In other
words docker build creates a new image, docker pull downloads an image into the local
file system and docker run executes a container based on the given image. Docker has
five major parts: docker, dockerd, images, containers and registries. "docker" is a binary
providing a CLI for accessing dockerd, the daemon process of Docker which is the entity
that implements majority of the functionality of a Docker system. Images and containers
are analogous to classes and objects in programming: a class is basically a template used
for building objects and similarly Docker uses images for building containers. Finally,
registries behave much like version control repositories and provide databases of images
that can then be pulled by Docker daemons and support tagging different versions of the
images.
build
pull
run
Figure 8. Docker high level architecture [36]
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Docker has two editions: commercial Docker-EE (Enterprise Edition) and open source
Docker-CE (Community Edition) [37]. Both have same core parts, but the former offers
additional features such as image security scanning. Nowadays Docker supports native
Windows and Mac execution but initially it was developed solely for Linux.
4.2 Architecture
A Docker system consists of multiple binaries and an example system can be seen in
figure 9. docker and containerd-ctr are both executed from command line and provide a
CLI to interact with daemon processes dockerd and containerd via UNIX sockets. The
functionality of containerd-ctr is also implemented as part of dockerd in libcontainerd
and therefore containerd-ctr is redundant in typical systems. containerd-shim is the part
of the system that is given the task of supervising a single container as well as starting
and stopping it via runc program. It needs to be noted that all of the programs in figure 9
can be replaced with other programs if they support OCI specification.
Figure 9. Example Docker system on one computer
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Docker daemon is typically started in Linux initialization and automatically starts contain-
erd. In Docker 1.12.5, which uses containerd version 0.2.0, containerd is only responsible
of executing containers and managing running processes [38]. For example, Docker per-
forms the mounting of container file systems. Newer versions such as containerd 1.1.0
released on 1.5.2018 perform most of the per-machine functionality [39] [40]. When a
container is started, an instance of containerd-shim is created for starting and monitoring
the container. containerd-shim then uses runc for starting the container. runc exits after
the container has been created leaving containerd-shim as the parent of the newly created
container.
4.3 Functionality
Starting a container begins with messaging dockerd to start a container, e.g. by CLI or
using dockerd API directly. For example command docker run --rm -it ubuntu:16.04
/bin/bash uses Docker CLI to send dockerd command to execute a container based on
"ubuntu" image with tag "16.04". Additional flags rm, i, and t cause container to be
deleted once it exits, STDIN to be connected and pseudo-tty to be allocated for the con-
tainer respectively. Finally, /bin/bash is the entry point in the container like the init pro-
gram in Linux.
Once dockerd receives the command it first checks the local file system for image–tag pair
downloading required layers if they are not present. After this the union mount file system
of the container is mounted and forwarded to containerd for running. Union mount file
system is discussed later in this chapter. Containerd then starts containerd-shim process
for the new container, which handles the management of the container and calls runc
program for interaction with containers.
Runc is the piece of the system which performs all the interactions with Linux to manage
containers [41]. After the task has been executed runc exits and leaves the process calling
runc in command for the newly created container to minimize the used resources. Runc
process is also initiated always when changes must be made into containers, e.g. when
new processes are manually started in containers.
By default, the Docker containers use UTS, IPC, PID, mount and network namespaces.
User namespace can be taken into use by modifying configuration. Containers do not use
cgroup namespace. This means that /proc/self/cgroup contains information from outside
the virtualized environment. Mount namespace, however, virtualizes the /sys/fs/cgroup
mount meaning that processes in container do not have access to cgroup configuration
outside of container.
4.4 Features
This section discusses Docker features that should be understood when deploying Docker
systems.
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4.4.1 Union Mount File System
Union mount file system or unioning file system is a term describing series of file systems
used on Linux that are based on layers [42]. Some of these file systems are aufs, overlayfs,
xfs and vfs. Docker uses union mount file system for handling multiple images, so their
total size can be kept minimal.
Union mount file system layers are simply directories under Linux file system which can
then be combined into a single view. Each file system version handles the layers a bit
differently, e.g. overlayfs can only handle two layers but more layers are added using
hard links1 while aufs can natively handle more than two layers. Figure 10 shows an
example of overlayfs layers. Lowerdir contains all layers of the image and upperdir is the
read-write layer for the container.
When a Docker container is started it is isolated from the host file system with mount
namespaces. The namespace propagation set for Docker can be either slave or private.
This propagation setting makes it possible to unmount the host root file system from the
container root and remount the unioning mount file system. Volumes and bind mounts
also work in a similar manner and are mounted after the root file system.
Figure 10. OverlayFS layer schematic [43]
4.4.2 Storage
Preferred methods for storing data with Docker containers are volumes, bind mounts and
tmpfs mounts. The other way to store data is to store it directly into the file system of the
container but as the containers use unioning file system this causes slower write speeds
and data does not persist after container is deleted [44].
Volume is a part of the host file system that is shared between containers and the host
and is meant to be used as an inter-container file system [45]. This part is managed by
dockerd and is either removed once the container exits if --rm flag is specified or left
dangling. Volumes can be initialized with read-only or with read-write permissions and
are initialized by specifying the path inside a container that is to be mounted as a volume.
1 Hard link is a link to an existing inode which is a Linux structure for managing files and directories.
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If the mount path inside the container contains data preceding the mount those files are
copied into the volume and are available to other containers.
Bind mounts are like volumes but instead of being managed by dockerd their mount points
in the host file system are explicitly specified [46]. If the mount path of the container
already contains files, those files are obscured by the files residing in the host mount
point.
Tmpfs (Temporary File System) mounts work the same way as mount -t tmpfs -o size=<size>
tmpfs /path/to/dir on normal Linux, that is, they mount the specified point directly into
the memory of the machine instead of non-volatile memory [47]. This is a good way to
store critical data such as passwords inside containers as the data is destroyed on power
down and also provides a faster way of storage as accessing memory is many times faster
than writing into or reading from a file.
4.4.3 Resource Management
Docker provides ways to limit resources such as CPU time, memory and block IO of
individual containers [48]. Limits are enforced using cgroup. By default, there are no
limitations except that changing scheduling policy and priorities are not enabled. De-
fault permissions can be changed when starting containers by specifying command line
arguments.
By default, containers can use CFS and all of the CPU cores but with command line argu-
ments they can be designated to specific cores and CPU resources can be limited [48]. For
example docker run --cpus="1.5" --cpuset-cpus="0,1" --cpu-shares="512" hello-world
will run container based on image hello-world on 1.5 CPUs on cores 0 and 1 with weight
of 512. What this means is that one of the cores behaves normally with the container
and other can be allocated for container half of the time. If the CPU is overloaded --cpu-
shares specifies the relative weight of the process. Otherwise it has no effect. Containers
can be given permissions for executing RT processes and modifying process priorities by
specifying arguments --cap-add=sys_nice and --ulimit rtprio=<value>. Where <value>
is between 0 and 99. On the low level the flags specified in the example cause new cgroup
to be created which perform the actual resource management. For example --cpuset-
cpus="0,1" creates a new cgroup under /sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset/docker/<container hash>.
This directory then contains a file cpuset.cpus which has string 0-1, i.e. the container uses
cores 0 and 1.
Docker can limit container’s user space memory, kernel memory, memory swap max sizes
and memory swappiness2 [48]. Additionally, it is possible to set soft limits for memory us-
age when Docker detects contention or low memory on host machine. For example com-
2 Relative weight of swapping process’s memory
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mand docker run --memory="4m" --memory-swap="4m" --memory-swappiness="50" -
-kernel-memory="20m" hello-world will run hello world image based container with 4
MiB of available memory, setting max swap size to 0 bytes, setting swappiness to 50 and
limiting available kernel memory to 20 MiB. Docker documentation falsely talks about
Megabytes in this context when configuration JSON under container’s directory functions
with powers of two.
Docker currently only supports cgroup v1 as v2 does not support all required controllers
such as freezer. The discussion for using the v2 in Docker is open as of June 2018 [49].
4.4.4 Networking
Docker offers five options for networking: none, bridge, macvlan, host and overlay [50].
Network interfaces of multiple containers can additionally be shared [6, pp. 94–96].
Containers with different interfaces and inter-container networks can be found in figure
11. In the OS level the networking is performed using Linux network namespaces.
Figure 11. Different container types. Adapted from [6, pp. 82]
None, bridge, macvlan and host are different ways of connecting containers to host net-
work. None is the simplest of the networking options and provides only a loopback inter-
face without any external connections [50]. Bridge driver is the default network driver and
provides a virtual bridged network inside host machine [51]. Macvlan mimics a physical
network by assigning MAC address for each container in its network and can therefore
be used for applications that expect to be connected directly into physical network inter-
face [52]. Host network driver does not isolate the network stack of the container at all
providing no isolation [53]. Network interface of two containers is shared in program 9.
This creates a container pair where the programs of different containers are isolated from
each other in all other ways except for the network interface.
Overlay network (not to be mixed with overlayfs) is a network driver operating on inter-
dockerd level [54]. It provides a network connecting multiple daemons together. Docker
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1 # do ck e r run −d −−name brady \
2 −−n e t none a l p i n e : l a t e s t \
3 nc − l 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 : 3 3 3 3
4
5 # do ck e r run − i t −−n e t c o n t a i n e r : b rady \
6 a l p i n e : l a t e s t n e t s t a t −a l
Program 9. Creating an inter-container network interface [6, pp. 95]
versions older than 17.06 only use overlay networks for swarms (group of Docker sys-
tems providing same service) but since version 17.06 it has also been possible to connect
standalone containers to overlay network [55].
4.4.5 Images and Containers
Images are file system templates stored in Docker registries bundled with metadata, e.g.
default entry point for the image. Images consist of layers and each layer is named by
SHA256 hash of the tarred data of that layer [56]. Docker also supports building new
images based on base images. They work so that first all layers used by the base image
are built and new layers are then built on top of these layers to produce a new image.
This means that child images have no notion of their base images, but only of their layers.
Taken these facts updating a base image does not propagate into child images without
rebuilding the child images, i.e. if image B depends on image A and image A is rebuilt
with new layer, image B has to be rebuilt in order for this change to propagate into image
B.
Docker images are managed using URLs like my.registry.com:5000/path/to/repository:tag
where my.registry.com is the domain name of registry, 5000 is the port and rest is used
for referencing the image. In case the image is hosted in hub.docker.com the images are
referenced with format username/registry:tag. For example, URL arm32v7/python:2.7
references an image in Docker Hub owned by username (or in this case, organization)
arm32v7, in repository python with tag 2.7 which in this case also refers to the Python
interpreter version. If the tag field is omitted when dereferencing an image, the default
tag of latest is used which in the case of this image points to same image as tags 3,
3.6 and 3.6.5. The tags and image contents do not have to match in any way and e.g.
user/repo:tag1 and user/repo:tag2 could have no common files at all. This is of course
not recommended as the repository structure might prove complicated with larger repos-
itories and therefore naming should be systematic e.g. one functionality per repository
and tags pointing to different versions of the image. An example structure of a repository
can be seen in figure 12. The columns in the figure represent the images and their layers
and tags point to different instances of the same repository. As seen in the figure, tags do
not have to have any common layers.
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Figure 12. The relation of tags and layers
Containers are deployed instances of images and have multiple read-only layers on bot-
tom, which are the same layers as in images they are based on, and one read-write layer
on top of these where all the changes are made. As the structure is similar it is also
possible to produce new images by storing the state of containers but overall this is not
recommended as it will increase the number of layers and produce extra overhead.
4.4.6 Swarm Mode Overview
Swarm is a Docker mode used for grouping machines together where one group is called
a swarm [57]. Swarm mode is designed to be used for servers where scalability is an
important trait. Embedded systems however rarely need to offer services scalable this
way and therefore swarm mode is only briefly discussed.
Swarm mode revolves around services which are defined and assigned for a swarm and
can be marked as replicated or global. The former kind are deployed depending on the
need and the latter kind once for each available machine which meets the placement re-
quirements and resource constraints. A swarm works by first creating a virtual overlay
network which puts all swarm devices under a single network, which also implies that
devices have to be visible to each other. When swarm services are then requested from a
certain port mapped for swarm, the traffic is rerouted to devices performing the requested
service. If multiple machines with a same service exist, the requests are automatically
balanced among the devices.
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4.5 Information Security
One of the key benefits of virtualizing the execution context of a process is security. Con-
tainers are of course a better solution than native execution of software from the security
point of view since an attacker has to cross one more barrier before accessing the whole
system. This section discusses few security problems of Docker and how they can be
addressed.
Older Docker versions are not able to protect the system from fork bomb attacks3. This
is due to Linux versions prior to 4.4 not having pids cgroup. A workaround for this is to
set PID limits on users but in this case if a user starts multiple containers, all processes
inside these containers count towards the maximum number of PIDs. One other way is
to manually put dockerd to pids cgroup for limiting the number of PIDs if the kernel
version is new enough, but Docker still lacks the support for this functionality. This of
course limits only the total count of processes running in containers rather than managing
individual containers. Docker versions since 1.11 have --pids-limit flag for limiting the
number of processes inside a container.
Privilege escalation is a real threat in all Docker versions since user namespace is not
enabled by default and the settings can be overridden using command line arguments [58].
Any user having access to socket used by dockerd, e.g. root users or users belonging to
docker user group, can execute a container and the same user will gain permissions of
root inside that container. This alone is not dangerous but by running command docker
run –rm -it -v /:/mnt/ ubuntu /bin/bash as user with UID 1000 I was able to modify files
belonging to the root user in the host system without password checks. This command
starts a Docker container and mounts the root of the host file system into /mnt/ path in
the container file system. The user namespace can be enabled by modifying dockerd
configuration but as the user can override default configuration by specifying command
line arguments the problem cannot be removed. The only way to prevent the privilege
escalation is to limit the permissions to dockerd socket.
Docker containers can be easily hardened using AppArmor profiles [59]. This profile is
assigned to container at start time with options --security-opts apparmor=profilename.
Container which do not need any access to host file system should for example be com-
pletely revoked of permissions there. Additional security can be achieved by applying a
MAC profile also for dockerd. Network interfaces for the containers should also be hard-
ened. This can be achieved with using a fitting network setting. For example, containers
which do not need a network connection should use Docker network none i.e. isolating
the container in its own network namespace without any virtual Ethernets connected.
Docker registries support TLS encryption and storing only hashes of the passwords so
the information security on the server side is good but dockerds have to supply the plain
3 Fork bomb attacks are performed using a process which forks itself over and over consuming system
resources.
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text credentials to the servers [60] [61]. This is problematic on embedded systems as the
devices have to be autonomous, so the credentials need to be stored on the device but at the
same time the devices are often physically accessible. This means that if an attacker gains
access to the device the credentials are completely visible. To make this harder the system
can be configured to give dockerd the credentials using STDIN instead of command line
arguments, so the credentials are not visible in system log. The credentials can also be
hard coded into the program to make accessing them harder. By default, the credentials
are stored unencrypted in /.docker/config.json. This can be fixed by configuring Docker
with external program for storing credentials. Credentials should also be device specific
to make accessing other devices hard and make it possible to revoke permissions from one
device if compromised. This way it is also possible to change credentials in one device
without needing to update all machines.
4.6 Cross Building Docker
This section discusses cross building Docker using Yocto. Normal Docker build system
is bootstrapped by default meaning that Docker binaries are typically built using older
version of Docker. This works fine for traditional use cases such as servers but introduces
problems when the aim is to cross build Docker for another architecture.
4.6.1 Yocto Overview
Yocto is a powerful tool used for configuring and building Linux systems. Yocto uses
OpenEmbedded project as its core and BitBake as its build tool for building custom Linux
distributions [62]. Simply put, Yocto uses series of shell and python scripts to build
everything regarding the new system, including toolchain, kernel, root file system etc.
Yocto build system is rather complicated on first look as it differs quite a lot from typical
Makefiles commonly used for building Linux systems. The hierarchy consists of config-
uration files, such as local.conf and bblayers.conf which configure e.g. the architecture
used and what recipes are included into the build. Recipes themselves are written into
files ending with .bb, .bbappend and .bbclass and tell how different components are built
into the system.
Yocto works in principle by building everything needed for the target system. This in-
cludes e.g. compiler and libraries. Yocto build process consists of downloading required
files from their sources, e.g. from Git repositories, configuring the files, e.g. by applying
.patch files to them and building parts of the file system. Each recipe places its build
outputs under its own build directory in paths equal to ones in the root file system. After
building phase these directory structures are combined and root file system is produced if
no conflicts are detected.
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4.6.2 Docker Yocto Recipe
The Yocto recipe of Docker can be found in [63]. The recipe in tag Morty has expected
runtime dependencies to containerd and runc but the recipe also lists runtime dependen-
cies to curl, aufs-util, git, util-linux and iptables. Of these dependencies the aufs-util and
git can be removed if the system uses OverlayFS instead of aufs and if pulling images
from git using git protocol is not needed. Git is a quite large binary so considerable
amount of space could be saved by removing it. Git and curl also seem to have been com-
pletely removed from the dependencies of the recipe in newer sumo tag of Yocto which
might be due to functionality being added directly to Docker.
As stated before the typical Docker build process is executed using Docker images de-
signed for building. For Yocto, where even the Software Development Kit is built from
source, this is not an option. Therefore, the build is performed natively and all dependen-
cies are included in the Go environment used by Yocto.
4.6.3 Linux Configurations
As Docker uses Linux kernel features to virtualize the process environments Linux also
requires certain configurations to be enabled for Docker to work properly. The list of
required and optional configurations is easiest to acquire by running check-config.sh from
the Git repository of Docker-CE on the development machine if it runs a Linux based
system. The list gained by executing the script with the configuration of the kernel used
in measurements can be found in appendix B. As seen in the configuration Docker has
multiple mandatory configurations and even more secondary dependencies. The former
is what are suggested to be enabled for Docker to function normally and the latter are
used for enabling different features such as parts of resource management and information
security. The configuration for user namespace is also an optional configuration which is
due to possible single user configuration of Linux.
4.7 Setting Up a Docker System
Docker systems can be broadly customized and especially with larger image count the
systems may become quite complicated. This section discusses how a Docker system can
and should be configured to handle this complexity.
4.7.1 Configuring Machines
Docker daemons can be configured by either specifying command line arguments when
starting the daemon or by writing a JSON configuration file which is read during dockerd
start. Of these the latter is the suggested way as it is more verbose. Linux configurations
can also be tweaked to enable or disable different Docker features.
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Docker daemon can be configured to use TCP socket instead of Unix socket which would
enable managing the system from remote location, but this of course introduces new risks
and the connection should be at least password protected [64]. This approach is however
not recommended and instead an SSH connection should be used for accessing the docker
CLI on the remote machine. This enables the use of authentication methods other than
username–password pairs and solves an issue where remote docker CLI requires root
permissions on the machine it is running in. More security can be added by enabling
firewall rules e.g. via iptables to enable connections only from certain addresses.
As the embedded systems deployed to field often have to be autonomous, most of the
functionality in the system should be automatic. For example, updated Docker images
should be pulled from registries if new versions are available. This can be accomplished
by e.g. writing a custom daemon program which gives orders to Docker daemon or by
writing shell scripts which use docker for interfacing the dockerd. One example of this
kind of program is open-horizon [65]. Open-horizon works by transmitting JSON data
across network and makes it possible to register workloads and microservices into a cloud.
These are then automatically deployed to devices using Docker containers after a while.
One easy way to group Docker machines together is to deploy an overlay network con-
necting the machines. Using overlay networks, the external user can address the whole
system via a single address which is a good way to abstract layout of the actual network.
Swarm mode can be useful with embedded systems when the workload is not device spe-
cific. One example of this could be a distributed database which does not have to be
running on every machine.
4.7.2 Configuring Docker Registry and Managing Images
Docker uses Docker Hub as its default Docker registry, but it is also possible to deploy
custom registries. This can basically be implemented in any way that supports the registry
API of Docker, but the easiest and preferred way is to use prebuilt Docker image meant
for this purpose: "registry". The same registry image can be used for generating encrypted
credentials into host system and to run the registry itself. For test purposes the registry
can be executed using unencrypted HTTP connection. TLS encryption should always
be used for registries that are visible to external network. An alternative authentication
to standard username-based authentication is token-based authentication. Token based
authentication uses external service to provide authentication which makes it possible to
manage credentials without accessing registry at all. Some other things that should be
considered are creating a bind mount for storing registry data even after the container is
destroyed and to deploy the registry as a swarm instead of a container which enables load
sharing among multiple servers if the usage is high.
As stated before, Docker images are based on layers. Modification of a base image does
not propagate into child images. Therefore, modifying base image should result in re-
compilation of all descendant images. This recompilation step can be evaded if the base
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image is changed to configuration image, which deploys configuration files to a volume
which is then shared with containers which need these configurations. This multi-image
solution is good for lowering the server load and bandwidth usage but might introduce
a small startup latency in the target system. Figure 13 shows different structure of base
images and configuration volume structure.
Figure 13. Base layer vs configuration volume
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5. TEST SETUP
This chapter discusses the tests run with Docker containers to study if they are a feasible
technology for embedded and/or RT systems.
5.1 Test System
Tests were run on WRM247+, Internet of Things (IoT) device with RT Linux. The sys-
tem has a Cortex-A5 single core processor, 256 MiB of DDR2 memory and 256 MiB of
NAND flash. Additionally, the machine has peripherals such as digital and analog IOs,
USB buses, CAN, RS485, RS-232, Ethernet and SD card slot [9]. Before testing the sys-
tem was running RT patched version of Linux 3.6.9 but this was replaced with RT patched
Linux 4.9 since Docker suggests minimum Linux version of 3.10 [66]. The system also
contains two OSs which made it possible to have one running OS download the new OS
using network and flash it into the location of the other OS. This makes Over-the-air
(OTA) updates possible. The flash reserved for each read-only root file system is 29 MiB.
Additionally, the system has a read-write shared partition with a size of 182 MiB shared
among the OSs. The shared partition is not flashed during update.
WRM247+ was chosen as the test platform as it was offered by Wapice and is used in real
applications. Already existing RT Linux also supported this choice as Docker had not yet
been studied with RT systems. WRM247+ is normally used for industrial Internet and
IoT applications. Due to the lack of flash the test applications and Docker were placed
on external SD card which was formatted to ext4. Docker additionally had problems with
mounting overlayfs into SD card so mounts were placed in internal flash shared partition.
Docker was chosen as the container technology mainly due to its vast documentation
and broad adoption in the industry. Docker’s already existing Yocto recipe made the
cross compilation easy. Many container technologies are also compatible with each other
making the performance of different engines, in theory, quite similar.
5.2 Test Design
Embedded systems generally have limited resources, mainly CPU time, memory and non-
volatile memory. Additionally, RT requirements enforce rule that the system has to react
to stimuli in a predetermined time. Tests were designed to measure these critical proper-
ties to find out what kind of overhead containers introduce into the system.
To test the CPU latency produced by containers, POSIX IPC was chosen. POSIX IPC in-
terface is simpler than that of System V’s and with IPC it is possible to distribute variable
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number of programs inside and outside of containers and compare the latencies and there-
fore find out the extra latency produced by containers. Up to 21 processes were executed
simultaneously. This was chosen as top limit as embedded system generally have far less
payload processes.
The interesting part of the memory consumption is the overhead produced by containers.
Therefore, memory consumption was decided to be measured using the same tests as
IPC latency but simultaneously logging the memory usage. Docker daemon memory
consumption was also measured to find the overhead compared to execution in a system
without Docker running.
File system usage was measured simply by checking the sizes of the files included in the
system with Docker. To produce a realistic result hard links were discarded as two hard
links pointing to a same file will both have the size of that file even though only one file
exists in the file system. The test image size was compared with the sizes of files included
in that image to check the extra driver usage of images.
5.3 Test Implementation
The first step of testing was to change the Yocto version used with the system from tag
Dylan to tag Morty. This step was performed as Dylan does not contain a Docker recipe
by default and the Linux versions were not officially supported by Docker. Other option
for the Yocto tag was Rocko but this was not chosen due to issues with binutils 2.29 and
Thumb2 instruction set [67]. The Linux version 4.9 was chosen for the measurements as it
was the newest Linux version included in Morty by default and had an RT patch available.
After Linux was configured correctly for Docker and Docker successfully executed on
the device the Docker and its dependencies were moved to another image in Yocto which
could be easily moved to the SD card attached to the device. The original locations of the
relocated files were replaced with symbolic links1 pointing to the new locations.
The core test application used for latency and memory testing consisted of one master
process and multiple slave processes implemented in C that communicated with each
other via named semaphores. The binaries were cross compiled, directly copied to the SD
card and slave binary additionally placed in a Docker image with its dependencies and
downloaded to the device via a Docker registry running on the development machine. The
test application also had shell scripts used for running multiple tests sequentially. Memory
test was identical to latency test except for one extra process running concurrently with
lower priority logging the output of free to a log file.
Tests were run with slave counts of 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15 and 20 each with slaves executed
either natively without containers, all slaves within a single container and with all slaves
1 Symbolic link contains a path of another object.
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placed in individual containers. This resulted in 20 different measurements as there were
only two measurements with one slave. Master was always executed natively and posted
all slave semaphores 100,000 times on each execution logging the time difference between
posting the semaphores and consuming all semaphores posted by the slaves.
One iteration of the latency measurement can be seen in figure 14. As all processes are
executing with SCHED_FIFO and RT priority of 99, the processes do not interrupt one
another and processes need to voluntarily release the CPU i.e. the executing process is
switched when the current process starts to wait for a semaphore.
Figure 14. Test execution
5.3.1 Core Test Application
The main function of the master program can be found in program 10. Program takes
all slave IDs as command line arguments and posts the respective semaphores. If no
matching slave exists, the test will halt as master tries to wait its semaphore more times
than it is posted stopping the process on line 23.
The main function of the slave program can be found from program 11. Similarly, to the
master program, slave takes all slave IDs as arguments. Then parent slave process forks
itself until all slave IDs can be distributed among programs. Slaves then proceed to wait
for semaphores pointed by their IDs and simply post master’s semaphore once they are
executed. Starting multiple slaves would have been simpler using shell scripts but plain
C implementation was chosen to keep the containers as basic as possible.
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1 i n t main ( i n t argc , char ** a rgv ) {
2
3 / / I n i t t h e t e s t s y s t e m .
4 i n t r e t = i n i t ( a rgc , a rgv ) ;
5 i f ( r e t < 0 ){
6 e x i t ( 1 ) ;
7 }
8 i n t e x e c _ c o u n t = MEAS_COUNT;
9
10 p r i n t f ( " S t a r t Time \ t \ t S t o p Time \ t \ t D e l t a \ n " ) ;
11
12 whi le ( exec_coun t −−){
13 / / S t o r e s t a r t t i m e
14 s e t s t a r t t i m e (& g l a t e n c y ) ;
15
16 i n t i ;
17 / / Pos t a l l s l a v e semaphores
18 f o r ( i =0 ; i < argc −1; i ++){
19 shdsem_pos t ( gmtos_sems [ i ] ) ;
20 }
21 / / Consume own semaphore u n t i l a l l s l a v e s have p o s t e d
22 f o r ( i =0 ; i < argc −1; i ++){
23 shdsem_wai t ( gstom_sem ) ;
24 }
25 / / S t o r e s t o p t i m e
26 s e t s t o p t i m e (& g l a t e n c y ) ;
27 / / C a l c u l a t e d e l t a
28 c a l c d i f f (& g l a t e n c y ) ;
29
30 / / P r i n t r e s u l t t o s t d o u t
31 p r i n t f ( "%l u \ t%l d \ t%l u \ t%l d \ t%l u \ t%l d \ n " ,
32 g l a t e n c y . s t a r t . t v _ s e c ,
33 g l a t e n c y . s t a r t . t v _ n s e c ,
34 g l a t e n c y . s t o p . t v _ s e c ,
35 g l a t e n c y . s t o p . t v _ n s e c ,
36 g l a t e n c y . d i f f . t v _ s e c ,
37 g l a t e n c y . d i f f . t v _ n s e c ) ;
38 n a n o s l e e p (&LOOPDELAY_NS, NULL ) ;
39
40 }
41
42 d o _ c l e a n u p ( argc , a rgv ) ;
43
44 }
Program 10. Main function of the master
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1 i n t main ( i n t argc , char ** a rgv ) {
2
3 p r i n t f ( " F o r k i n g . . . \ n " ) ;
4 d o _ f o r k i n g ( argc −1, &argv [ 1 ] ) ;
5
6 p r i n t f ( " I n i t i a l i z i n g . . . \ n " ) ;
7 i n t r e t = i n i t ( g s l a v e _ i d ) ;
8
9 i f ( r e t != 0 ){
10 p r i n t f ( " I n i t f a i l e d \ n " ) ;
11 e x i t ( 1 ) ;
12 }
13 p r i n t f ( " E x e c u t i n g : \ n " ) ;
14 whi le ( 1 ) {
15 shdsem_wai t ( gmtos_sem ) ;
16 / / E x i t i f c t r l semaphore has been p o s t e d
17 i f ( ! s h d s e m _ t r y w a i t ( g c t r l _ s e m ) ) {
18 break ;
19 }
20 shdsem_pos t ( gstom_sem ) ;
21 }
22
23 }
Program 11. Main function of the slave
5.3.2 Test Scripts
Two BusyBox shell scripts were used to make testing the containers more automated [68].
The script used in latency testing can be found in appendix A and the memory test script
in program 12. Formerly mentioned script simply executes tests with given number of
slaves, e.g. ./exec_latency_test 1 2 3 would execute all tests with 1, 2 and 3 slaves and
write log to different log files.
Dockerfile used to create the test image can be found in program 13. The image produced
by the file contains the slave binary and all its dependencies listed by executing objdump.
A simple Docker registry container was then setup on development Ubuntu and the image
pushed there so it could be pulled from the embedded board.
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1 # ! / b i n / sh
2
3 OUTPUT_FILE=" mem_output . t x t "
4
5
6 doLog ( ) {
7 rm −f ${OUTPUT_FILE}
8 whi le t rue
9 do
10 f r e e >> ${OUTPUT_FILE}
11 s l e e p 1
12 done
13 }
14
15
16
17 doLog &
18 LOG_PID=" $ ! "
19 . / e x e c _ l a t e n c y _ t e s t . sh "$@"
20 k i l l ${LOG_PID}
Program 12. Memory test shell script
1 # Docker f i l e f o r c r e a t i n g images
2 # f o r measu r ing o v e r h e a d i n t r o d u c e d by c o n t a i n e r s
3 #
4 # @author Toni Lammi t o n i . lammi@wapice . com
5
6 # C r e a t e a base image ( n o t based on any o t h e r image )
7 FROM s c r a t c h
8
9 ENV PATH " / l i b : / u s r / l i b "
10 # CPU l a t e n c y s l a v e , i n s t a l l e d t o r o o t o f t h e image
11 ADD s l a v e /
12
13 # L i n k e r and dynamic l i b r a r i e s
14 ADD ld −2 .23 . so / l i b / ld−l i n u x−armhf . so . 3
15 ADD l i b c −2 .23 . so / u s r / l i b / l i b c . so . 6
16 ADD l i b p t h r e a d −2 .23 . so / l i b / l i b p t h r e a d . so . 0
17
18 # D e f a u l t e n t r y p o i n t f o r t h e c o n t a i n e r
19 CMD [ " / s l a v e " , " 0 " , " 1 " , " 2 " ]
Program 13. Dockerfile used to build test containers
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6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter discusses the results of measurements described in chapter 5.
6.1 Inter-process Communication Latency
Measurement results were divided into four groups: min, mean, max and worst first la-
tency. The first three do not include first latency measurement since it was consistently
the largest latency. The worst first latency contains the longest first latency measurement
of all test executions. Measurement results can be found in figures 15 and 16. The first
shows the min, mean, max and worst first latencies of two slave test with 3 measure-
ment executions, totaling in 300,000 iterations. The second is the same measurement but
performed with 20 slaves.
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Figure 15. Minimum, mean, max and start latency with two slaves
The first groups in figures 15 and 16 are the worst first latencies when executing tests.
As seen in the figures, with smaller slave counts the processes inside containers behave
without notable difference to native processes. With larger slave counts, i.e. with 10, 15
and 20 slaves, executing slave processes in containers introduced long first measurement
latencies as seen in figure 16.
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Figure 16. Minimum, mean, max and start latency with 20 slaves
The generally longer first latency might be due to Linux’s caches but since there is no dif-
ference between native and container processes it is out of the scope of this thesis. For the
extra-long first latencies I considered the container boot times. It might be that processes
such as containerd-shim which inherit the priority of dockerd might not have enough time
to bring up containers before the master is first started and therefore interfering with the
measurements. To test this hypothesis I executed new tests after setting the dockerd’s
scheduling policy to SCHED_FIFO and setting RT priority to 99 which was done using
command chrt -f 99 $(pidof dockerd). New tests were executed using only ten iterations
of latency measurements since the interesting part was only the first iteration of the la-
tency measurement. Results of these measurements can be found in figures 17 and 18.
Measurements were performed three times similarly to measurements discussed earlier in
this chapter.
As seen in the figures, the considerably longer first latency disappeared. As the priority
of dockerd was increased, also its child processes such as containerd-shims and runcs
inherited this priority being therefore able to finish initialization of containers before the
tests were initiated.
Figures 19, 20 and 21 contain test results for min, mean and max delay development
as a function of slave count. Additionally, the parameters of functions gained by linear
regression can be found in table 1. As seen in the table and figures, development of
latency is highly linear with no large enough differences between test cases to state any
differences in performance.
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Figure 17. IPC latencies with dockerd with RT priority and 2 slaves
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Figure 18. IPC latencies with dockerd with RT priority and 20 slaves
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Figure 19. Native execution latencies
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Figure 20. Single container execution latencies
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Figure 21. Individual container latencies
Table 1. Values of offset and differential of linear regression in figures 19, 20 and 21
y=ax+b Test case min mean max
native 131.7352 133.4428 137.1179
a (µs/pcs) single 130.3455 132.296 135.955
individual 131.6335 133.5599 137.0892
native 48.0266 54.3472 169.2941
b (µs) single 51.1362 57.8912 173.3508
individual 42.9437 49.9827 170.0959
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6.2 Memory Usage
The memory consumption measurements were executed three times, each measurement
execution consisting of 100,000 measurements totaling in 300,000 iterations. The de-
velopment of free memory as the function of slave count can be found in figure 22. The
figure contains three groups, each with different filling and three lines. The lines represent
min, mean and max memory consumption of the measurements.
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Figure 22. Free memory with different measurement occasions.
Distributing slave processes to individual containers consumes more memory than using
single container or executing the test natively. Linear regression characteristic values of
the mean memory usage can be found in table 2.
Table 2. Characteristic values of linear regressions of memory measurements
y=ax+b a (KiB/slave) b (MiB)
Native -541 200
Single Container -379 198
Individual Containers -1462 199
After performing container memory consumption, the dockerd’s memory usage was mea-
sured by toggling dockerd running and killed and logging the free memory. The results
can be found in table 3.
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Table 3. Free memory with and without dockerd running
Docker Daemon Running Docker Daemon Killed
Free Memory (MiB) 227 235
6.3 Mass Storage Usage
Mass storage usage of different binaries used by Docker can be found in table 4. Stripped
Total field ignores values of containerd-ctr and docker-proxy as they can be excluded
from the system without affecting the core functionality. The size of UBIFS1 root file
system produced by Yocto increased from 24.13 MiB to 81.38 MiB so the mass storage
consumption over tripled.
Table 4. Mass storage usage of different Docker binaries
Binary Name Size (MiB)
docker 11.12
docker-proxy 2.27
dockerd 33.16
containerd 12.95
containerd-ctr 12.41
containerd-shim 6.83
runc 10.79
Total 89.53
Stripped Total 74.85
Based on the table above we can state that deploying Docker to an embedded Linux
consumes considerable amount of storage. The files included in test Docker image had
total size of 1112892 bytes gained with ls -l. The size of the image produced was 11.1
MB according to docker images command so image does not consume much extra storage.
Image and container size is however quite complex subject and can be greatly affected by
how these features are used. For example, using one base image for multiple child images
can save space.
6.4 Container Measurements in Other Studies
Several studies considering Docker on servers and other non-embedded systems have
been concluded and since the functional principles of these machines are similar they can
be used to give some idea of the overhead introduced by Docker and containers in general
in embedded systems. This section introduces and discusses six of these studies and their
results.
Di Tomaso et. al compared using Docker container-based solution instead of native pro-
grams when calculating performance of genomic pipelines [69]. The study found out that
1 File system optimized for unmanaged flash storage.
45
with shorter tasks the containers were clearly worse solution than native execution but
when the execution time grew the performance of containers got closer and closer to na-
tive binaries. The measurements included start up times of the containers so containers
performed almost identically to native software if the start up time is ignored.
Felter et. al studied the overhead of VMs and Docker with different settings when running
an SQL server inside the container [70]. The measurements show that Docker is a lot
faster solution in running SQL server than KVM. The same measurements also show a
considerable drop in throughput when aufs is used as storage instead of volumes. Using
network namespaces produces minimal overhead compared to containers that share the
host network namespace.
A study by Arango et. al. studied different container technologies and compared their
performance to natively run software [71]. The study found out that bind mounts perform
better than unioning file system in both, reading and writing, but difference in writing
was especially large: the bind mount write was approximately 2.5 times as fast. When
random write and read were tested the difference was smaller but still the bind mount
operations were clearly faster. The largest overhead produced by Docker was measured
with network bandwidth where containers presented 16.96% higher bandwidth usage than
native software. Otherwise the overhead introduced by Docker when reading and writing
bind mounts was very minimal and performance was close to native processes. Similar
study performed in 2013 studied performance of LXC against other technologies [72].
This study got similar results to former study but also inspected the performance of the
test system under fork bomb attack which managed to bring LXC solution down but no
other technologies.
M.T. Chung et. al. studied the overhead of Docker and compared it to overhead of VMs
[73]. The results were again expected, and Docker generally produces minimal overhead
compared to VMs when executing distributed computing with high intensity. With higher
machine counts VM and container performances get closer to each other as an increasing
amount of resources is used for the task distribution instead of the actual computing.
Lastly, Avino et. al. measured Docker performance when containers run multimedia and
gaming servers [74]. This study was the only one to achieve results were the overhead
of Docker was not minimal. Multimedia servers introduced overhead of 45% when one
client was served but when the client count was raised to eight the overhead dropped
to under 10%. The respective overheads were 3% and less than 2% on gaming servers.
The exceptionally high overheads could be explained e.g. by badly optimized containers
where file operations are performed in unioning file system since container execution is
not well documented.
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The studies discussed in this section generally provided similar results as this study. Only
study which noticed a considerable overhead with containers did not explain the config-
uration of containers. Non-optimized configuration could explain at least some of the
overhead.
6.5 Information Security
Docker containers are a good addition from information security point of view. They
provide an easy way of hardening the system and can be further enhanced with MAC
programs such as AppArmor. This security however should not be blindly trusted as
attacker gaining access to a container can still break functionality of the container and
other depending containers. Containers are also not as well isolated from the host as
e.g. VMs. Some known Docker vulnerabilities are listed by Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) and the list seems to have more listings for older Docker versions than
newer [75]. Therefore, the Docker version used should always be the newest possible.
This is somewhat a problem as updating Docker for a custom device is not as straight
forward as for a Ubuntu running on AMD64 architecture.
6.6 System Deployment and Software Management
Tools provided by Docker help in deploying the systems. Overlay networks can pack
groups of dockerds into clusters and make it easier to address whole groups e.g. using
only one IP address. The autonomous containers then again make it possible to update the
Docker version while the containers are not affected in any way and as the applications
are executed in their own sandboxes the developers can design systems without having to
consider dependencies among applications as much as without Docker.
Docker provides a good way of managing software packages where each application can
be packaged into a sandbox or a group of sandboxes. This is a lot faster compared to
flashing a completely new firmware into the device and does not have same issues as
with Debian packages with read-only file systems. Containers also solve software depen-
dency issues which may exist with Debian packages and if an invalid Docker image is
downloaded the problem can be easily fixed by downloading a working version.
Docker container deployment can be automated using tools such as open-horizon which
only requires that images are pushed to a deployment server from which the deployment
to machines works automatically. New images also do not have to be completely down-
loaded into the devices, but it is enough to download only the layers which do not already
exist in the device therefore saving bandwidth.
The build system would also require an update when software is deployed in containers
instead of natively. At the beginning the development process works similarly to normal
development but after the software reaches a point where it can be taken into use the soft-
ware should be containerized, first manually. After the recipe for the image is functional
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additional steps can be added to normal build to pack the software into images and push
them to registries. In the case of production images, a notification should also be sent
to get the software into the devices. This obviously does not have to be done by build
software and can be done e.g. by the server handling the deployment.
6.7 Docker and the Test System
The test system is not a feasible platform for Docker as it is due to larger flash usage of the
root file system. This could however be fixed quite easily by increasing the flash reserved
for the file systems at the expense of shared partition. This would result in approximately
85 MiB partitions for root file systems and a 72 MiB shared partition. Docker then needs a
read-write partition for storing images and containers so the shared partition should either
be further divided into two or part of the partition should be used by Docker.
The major negative effect of this change would be that the layout of the flash would
change. This means that OTA updates are not simple between Docker and non-Docker
systems as the bootloader has to be reconfigured for the new OS. The smaller con is that
the storage left for e.g. measurements gets smaller (shared partition is used for this since
it is a read-write partition) and therefore, data might have to be stored to SD card. In case
of critical data an encryption mechanism should be provided for the file system.
Finally, the cost of deploying Docker should be considered. The obvious benefits are
better information security and software management but the implementation of Docker
would require changes to the update system and deploying new system for storing the
Docker images for downloading into devices.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The objective of this thesis was to determine if containers and especially Docker are a fea-
sible technology for embedded and RT Linux systems and what would be the advantages
and disadvantages of adopting the technology. The thesis first discussed the underlying
Linux features used by containers followed by more detailed description of Docker fea-
tures and information security and how to deploy Docker to an embedded system. The
next chapters discussed the design and results of measurements of Docker containers as
well as analyzed the changes required for the test system to deploy Docker. Measurements
and measurement results from other studies about Docker and other container engines
were also discussed.
From the measurements performed in this thesis and in other studies we can conclude
that performance-wise Docker containers are a feasible solution to be used in embedded
and RT Linux systems if the system has enough mass storage capacity and memory and
Docker images used with the programs are optimized. For comfortable use of Docker
some guidelines could be 10 MiB extra memory compared to native need and extra 80
MiB of mass storage space. No notable difference was found with IPC latencies in con-
tainerized and native applications. For the system used in tests Docker is a possible tech-
nology but requires changes to be made to the system. Docker could be executed in the
device, but this would need a flash layout change which would make the new firmware
incompatible with older bootloader configurations and vice versa. The complete analysis
of the feasibility would require analysis of required work compared to benefits gained
with Docker.
It was also found that Docker helps in deploying new software or updating old software
which can be done e.g. with help of additional processes. Docker was found to help with
information security as processes running in containers are isolated from the rest of the
system. Containers should however not to be blindly trusted as the protection is not per-
fect. To help with the security user could e.g. harden the system by applying AppArmor
to the system and handle the device permissions to the cloud so that compromised devices
do not have any extra permissions and all permissions are as easy to revoke as possible.
The usergroup docker should not be used to prevent privilege escalation.
The natural way of continuing the study would be to use different container engines, like
Balena and rkt, for similar tests and check the difference in their performance. The other
feature which should be scrutinized is execution of more optimized program both natively
and in container and inspecting these results. In this context a more optimized would
mean that e.g. no inter-process communication is used as it is a lot slower than using only
inter-thread communication. If containers were to be taken into use, some guidelines
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should also be created for development and deployment. This would require development
of a build system which can automatically create and push images to registries. Also,
some training would be required for embedded developers not previously familiar with
containers.
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APPENDIX A: LATENCY TEST SHELL SCRIPT
1 # ! / b i n / sh
2
3 # B in ar y names
4 MASTER_BIN=" . / m a s t e r "
5 SLAVE_BIN=" . / s l a v e "
6
7 LOG_FILE_postf ix=" . t x t "
8
9 LOG_FILE_na t ive_pre f ix =" n a t i v e "
10 LOG_FILE_s ing le_pre f ix =" c o n t _ s i n g l e "
11 LOG_FILE_ind_pref ix=" c o n t _ i n d "
12
13
14 # run −d −−i p c=h o s t −−cap−add=s y s _ n i c e \
15 # −−u l i m i t r t p r i o =99 1 0 . 1 6 5 . 1 6 3 . 1 8 8 : 5 0 0 0 / l a t e n c y t e s t : i n i t i a l
16 DOCKER_FLAGS="−d −−i p c = h o s t −−cap−add= s y s _ n i c e −−u l i m i t r t p r i o =99 "
17 DOCKER_LATENCY_TEST_IMAGE=" 1 0 . 1 6 5 . 1 6 3 . 1 8 8 : 5 0 0 0 / l a t e n c y t e s t "
18 DOCKER_ENTRY_POINT=" / s l a v e "
19
20 r m C o n t a i n e r s ( ) {
21 echo " Removing c o n t a i n e r s . . . "
22 do ck e r rm $ ( do ck e r ps −aq )
23 echo " C o n t a i n e r s removed "
24 }
25
26 e x e c N a t i v e ( ) {
27 ${SLAVE_BIN} $ ( seq 1 " $1 " )&
28 s l e e p 2
29 ${MASTER_BIN} $ ( seq 1 " $1 " ) > \
30 ${ LOG_FILE_na t ive_pre f ix }$ {1} ${ LOG_FILE_postf ix }
31 s l e e p 2
32 }
33
34 e x e c S i n g l e ( ) {
35 do ck e r run ${DOCKER_FLAGS} ${DOCKER_LATENCY_TEST_IMAGE} \
36 ${DOCKER_ENTRY_POINT} $ ( seq 1 " $1 " )
37
38 ${MASTER_BIN} $ ( seq 1 " $1 " ) >\
39 ${ LOG_FILE_s ing le_pre f ix }$ {1} ${ LOG_FILE_postf ix }
40 s l e e p 10
41
42 r m C o n t a i n e r s
43 }
44
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45 e x e c I n d i v i d u a l ( ) {
46 f o r i in $ ( seq 1 " $1 " )
47 do
48 do ck e r run ${DOCKER_FLAGS} ${DOCKER_LATENCY_TEST_IMAGE} \
49 ${DOCKER_ENTRY_POINT} $ i
50
51 done
52
53 ${MASTER_BIN} $ ( seq 1 " $1 " ) >\
54 ${ LOG_FILE_ind_pref ix }$ {1} ${ LOG_FILE_postf ix }
55 s l e e p 10
56
57 r m C o n t a i n e r s
58
59 }
60
61
62 echo " E x e c u t i n g t e s t s "
63
64 f o r i in "$@"
65 do
66 echo " T e s t i n g wi th $ i s l a v e s "
67 echo " Running n a t i v e t e s t s "
68 e x e c N a t i v e $ i
69 s l e e p 2
70 echo " Running t e s t i n s i n g l e c o n t a i n e r "
71 e x e c S i n g l e $ i
72
73 i f [ " $ i " −g t 1 ]
74 then
75 echo " Running t e s t i n i n d i v i d u a l c o n t a i n e r s "
76 e x e c I n d i v i d u a l $ i
77
78 f i
79 done
80
81 echo " F i n i s h e d "
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APPENDIX B: CHECK-CONFIG.SH OUTPUT
1 G e n e r a l l y N e c e s s a r y :
2 − cgroup h i e r a r c h y : p r o p e r l y mounted [ / s y s / f s / cg roup ]
3 − apparmor : e n a b l e d and t o o l s i n s t a l l e d
4 − CONFIG_NAMESPACES: e n a b l e d
5 − CONFIG_NET_NS : e n a b l e d
6 − CONFIG_PID_NS : e n a b l e d
7 − CONFIG_IPC_NS : e n a b l e d
8 − CONFIG_UTS_NS : e n a b l e d
9 − CONFIG_CGROUPS : e n a b l e d
10 − CONFIG_CGROUP_CPUACCT: e n a b l e d
11 − CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE : e n a b l e d
12 − CONFIG_CGROUP_FREEZER : e n a b l e d
13 − CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED : e n a b l e d
14 − CONFIG_CPUSETS : e n a b l e d
15 − CONFIG_MEMCG: e n a b l e d
16 − CONFIG_KEYS : e n a b l e d
17 − CONFIG_VETH : e n a b l e d
18 − CONFIG_BRIDGE : e n a b l e d
19 − CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER : e n a b l e d
20 − CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV4 : e n a b l e d
21 − CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER : e n a b l e d
22 − CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_MASQUERADE : e n a b l e d
23 − CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_ADDRTYPE : e n a b l e d
24 − CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONNTRACK : e n a b l e d
25 − CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_IPVS : e n a b l e d
26 − CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT : e n a b l e d
27 − CONFIG_NF_NAT : e n a b l e d
28 − CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED : e n a b l e d
29 − CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE : e n a b l e d
30
31 O p t i o n a l F e a t u r e s :
32 − CONFIG_USER_NS : m i s s i n g
33 − CONFIG_SECCOMP : m i s s i n g
34 − CONFIG_CGROUP_PIDS : m i s s i n g
35 − CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP: m i s s i n g
36 − CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP_ENABLED: m i s s i n g
37 − CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP : m i s s i n g
38 − CONFIG_BLK_DEV_THROTTLING : m i s s i n g
39 − CONFIG_IOSCHED_CFQ : m i s s i n g
40 − CONFIG_CFQ_GROUP_IOSCHED : m i s s i n g
41 − CONFIG_CGROUP_PERF : m i s s i n g
42 − CONFIG_CGROUP_HUGETLB: m i s s i n g
43 − CONFIG_NET_CLS_CGROUP : m i s s i n g
44 − CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO : m i s s i n g
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45 − CONFIG_CFS_BANDWIDTH : m i s s i n g
46 − CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED : m i s s i n g
47 − CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED : e n a b l e d
48 − CONFIG_IP_VS : m i s s i n g
49 − CONFIG_IP_VS_NFCT : m i s s i n g
50 − CONFIG_IP_VS_RR : m i s s i n g
51 − CONFIG_EXT4_FS : e n a b l e d
52 − CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL : m i s s i n g
53 − CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY : m i s s i n g
54 e n a b l e t h e s e e x t 4 c o n f i g s i f you a r e u s i n g e x t 3 o r e x t 4 as b a c k i n g f i l e s y s t e m
55 − Network D r i v e r s :
56 − " o v e r l a y " :
57 − CONFIG_VXLAN: m i s s i n g
58 O p t i o n a l ( f o r e n c r y p t e d n e t w o r k s ) :
59 − CONFIG_CRYPTO : e n a b l e d
60 − CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEAD : e n a b l e d
61 − CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM: e n a b l e d
62 − CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEQIV : e n a b l e d
63 − CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH : e n a b l e d
64 − CONFIG_XFRM: e n a b l e d
65 − CONFIG_XFRM_USER : e n a b l e d ( a s module )
66 − CONFIG_XFRM_ALGO: e n a b l e d ( a s module )
67 − CONFIG_INET_ESP : e n a b l e d ( a s module )
68 − CONFIG_INET_XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT : e n a b l e d ( a s module )
69 − " i p v l a n " :
70 − CONFIG_IPVLAN : m i s s i n g
71 − " macvlan " :
72 − CONFIG_MACVLAN: m i s s i n g
73 − CONFIG_DUMMY: m i s s i n g
74 − " f t p , t f t p c l i e n t i n c o n t a i n e r " :
75 − CONFIG_NF_NAT_FTP : m i s s i n g
76 − CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_FTP : m i s s i n g
77 − CONFIG_NF_NAT_TFTP : m i s s i n g
78 − CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_TFTP : m i s s i n g
79 − S t o r a g e D r i v e r s :
80 − " a u f s " :
81 − CONFIG_AUFS_FS : e n a b l e d
82 − " b t r f s " :
83 − CONFIG_BTRFS_FS : m i s s i n g
84 − CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_POSIX_ACL : m i s s i n g
85 − " dev icemappe r " :
86 − CONFIG_BLK_DEV_DM: e n a b l e d
87 − CONFIG_DM_THIN_PROVISIONING : m i s s i n g
88 − " o v e r l a y " :
89 − CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS : e n a b l e d
90 − " z f s " :
91 − / dev / z f s : m i s s i n g
92 − z f s command : m i s s i n g
93 − z p o o l command : m i s s i n g
94
95 L i m i t s :
60
96 − / p roc / s y s / k e r n e l / keys / roo t_maxkeys : 1000000
